








Business & Economics 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
























Department of Economics 
Wilfrid Laurier University, 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 
N2L 3C5 
Tel:  519.884.1970 




























Abstract.  This paper considers a successive oligopoly setting in which a set of 
upstream firms sell output non-exclusively to a group of downstream firms using a 
linear tariff. If the concavity of retail demand is constant then the profitability of 
horizontal merger at either the upstream or the downstream stage is shown to depend 
on the number of firms in the stage experiencing the merger and not on the number of 
firms in the other stage. Furthermore, the profitability of merger at either stage is the 
same as the profitability of merger amongst a set of vertically integrated firms in a 
setting in which all firms are vertically integrated. Finally, mergers at either stage are 
shown to reduce the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Moreover the negative 
effects of merger on surplus are unambiguously increased by increases in 
concentration in the merging stage and ambiguously affected by increases in 
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1. Introduction 
  The purpose of this paper is to explore the profit and welfare consequences of 
horizontal mergers at either the downstream or upstream stage of production in a 
successive oligopoly setting in which the contract governing trade between the two 
stages of production is linear and thus gives rise to double-marginalization.  This 
analysis is made relevant by recent consolidation at the retail level in both Europe and 
the US
1  and by ongoing theoretical and empirical debate about the ‘countervailing 
power’ benefits of retail consolidation.
2   The main conclusion of the paper is that if 
products and retailers are undifferentiated and the concavity of retail demand is 
constant then vertical separation has no effect on the profitability of horizontal merger 
at either the upstream or downstream stage of production.  This result is obtained by 
using an ‘arms-length’ linear contracting model and contrasts with the existing results 
in the literature which show that vertical separation either ambiguously effects or 
increases the profitability of merger depending on whether upstream and downstream 
firms bargain over a linear tariff or use a two-part tariff
3. 
It should be noted that anti-competitive mergers are generally unprofitable in 
vertically integrated Cournot oligopoly models in which marginal cost is constant.  In 
particular it has been shown
4 that in the absence of cost efficiency gains any output-
                                                           
1 For detailed evidence of increased retail concentration see Dobson and Waterson (1997) for various 
product groups in the UK during the 1982 to 1992 period, Dobson and Waterson (1999) for retail 
grocery for various European countries in the 1988 to 1996 period and Wrigley (2001) for US 
supermarket retailing during the 1992 to 1999 period. The role of mergers in bringing about the 
increased concentration was more significant in the US (Wrigley 2001) than in the UK (Dobson and 
Waterson 1999). 
2 Theoretical results concerning countervailing power are contained in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), von-
Ungern Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997).  For a review of some of the empirical 
literature and a general discussion of countervailing power see Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 527-35) 
and Dobson and Waterson (1999). 
3 Results concerning the profitability of merger in vertically separated settings are contained in Horn 
and Wolinsky (1988) and von-Ungern Sternberg (1996) for the linear bargaining case and in Ziss 
(2001) and González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001) for the case of two-part tariffs. 
4 See Levin (1990), Gaudet and Salant (1991) or Cheung (1992).  It should be pointed out that a 50 
percent market share is a necessary but not sufficient condition for profitable merger.  For example, if 
demand is linear then Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) have shown that profitable merger requires   2
reducing merger is profitable only if it involves more than 50 percent of the firms in 
the industry. This result emerges because any internalisation of market power gains 
brought about by a contraction in output of the merging parties is more than offset by 
an expansion in output of the non-merging parties.
5 My results show that horizontal 
mergers in Cournot oligopoly continue to be generally unprofitable when market 
structure goes from vertical integrated oligopoly to successive oligopoly. 
The model developed in this paper assumes the products sold by upstream 
manufacturers as well as the selling services of downstream retailers to both are 
homogeneous. As a result horizontal merger brings about shutdown and is thus 
equivalent to negative entry.  Secondly, I adopt the arms-length contracting model 
pioneered by Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Waterson (1980) which assumes that the 
upstream firms choose output taking into account the impact on the equilibrium 
wholesale price, where the later is determined by the derived demands of the 
downstream firms. The downstream retailers then take the wholesale price as given 
and choose output à la Cournot.  My comparative static results indicate that horizontal 
mergers at either the upstream or downstream stages reduce industry output and thus 
reduce welfare.  The upstream merger result generalises the well-known result derived 
by Seade (1980) for the case of Cournot oligopoly to the case of successive Cournot 
oligopoly. The downstream merger result has been the source of much debate as a 
result of the countervailing power hypothesis first put forward by Galbraith (1952).  
This argument states that buyer concentration may be pro-competitive because it may 
result in retailers gaining more bargaining power and thereby negotiating reductions 
in wholesale prices that are sufficiently large so as to overcome the increase in retail 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the merging parties’ market share to be at least 80 percent.  
5 The profitability of merger is improved if the loss of market share to non-merging parties is muted, as 
will be the case if marginal costs are increasing (Perry and Porter 1985); products are differentiated 
(Deneckere and Davidson 1983) or merger bestows upon the merged entity a first mover advantage   3
market power and reduce retail prices. My paper assumes that the retailers act as 
wholesale price takers both before and after the merger, which effectively means that 
the retailers have no bargaining power and that retail merger has no impact on 
bargaining power. The question addressed in this paper is thus whether an increase in 
retail bargaining power is actually a necessary condition for retail mergers to lower 
retail prices or whether the reduction in wholesale demand bought about by retail 
merger will be enough to induce manufacturers to lower prices even if retailer 
bargaining power remains at zero (i.e. they remain price takers). My results show that 
retail mergers have no impact on the wholesale price and thus result in higher retail 
prices. The conclusion is thus that an increase in retail bargaining power is a 
necessary condition for retail mergers to lower retail prices. 
A final set of results deal with the impact of market structure on the welfare 
effects of merger. The motivation for this analysis is to determine how the market 
structure in both stages should be taken into account when assessing the welfare 
effects of a merger that brings about a fixed cost saving.
6 The conventional wisdom
7 
is that mergers have more negative effects on the sum of producer and consumer 
surplus when markets are more concentrated. The implication of this wisdom is that 
mergers in concentrated markets require a greater fixed cost savings in order to 
increase welfare than mergers in less concentrated settings. My results indicate that 
the conventional wisdom holds even in markets that feature successive oligopoly but 
that this result does not apply to increases in concentration in the non-merging stage. 
In particular an increase in concentration in the non-merging stage will increase the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Daughety 1990, d’Aspremont et al. 1983). 
6 This issue is particularly relevant in retailing where many firms have merged in order to achieve the 
economics of scale needed to adopt new information technology (Wrigley 2001).  
7 To my knowledge the conventional wisdom has not been formally proved. Previous papers that have 
examined the welfare effects of merger (Levin 1990, Farrell and Shapiro 1990, McAfee and Williams 
1992) have focussed on models with heterogenous marginal cost and thus have not been able to derive   4
magnitude of the negative surplus effect of merger only if the non-merging stage is 
initially sufficiently unconcentrated.  If the non-merging stage is already concentrated 
then a further increase in concentration may reduce the magnitude of the negative 
surplus effect of merger.  This result is rather surprising as one would expect a priori 
that an increase in concentration which increases the extent of double marginalization 
would unambiguously worsen the negative surplus effect of any output reducing 
merger. The result is explained by the fact that an increase in the extent of double-
marginalization brought about by an increase in concentration at the non-merging 
stage reduces the output contraction brought about by merger and that this effect can 
overcome the higher mark-up induced by the increase in concentration.   
  The paper is organized as follows. The model and the results regarding the 
comparative statics of entry are contained in Section 2.  The profitability results are 
derived in Section 3.  Section 4 contains results concerning the impact of market 
structure on the welfare effects of merger and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Model and the Comparative Statics of Entry 
 
The model consists of r retailers and m manufacturers.  Each manufacturer 
produces a homogeneous product at constant marginal cost c and zero fixed cost.  The 
manufacturers sell homogeneous output non-exclusively to the retailers at the 
common wholesale price w. The non-differentiated retailers re-sell the output of the 
manufacturers at a common retail price P(Q), where Q represents industry output. 
The inverted demand function P(Q) is assumed to be strictly decreasing and twice 
continuously differentiable.  Now define β(Q) as the degree of concavity of retail 
demand and then assume that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the comparative results of an increase in the number of firms on the welfare effect of merger.   5
(1)      ) ( ) ( ) ( Q P Q Q P Q ′ ′ ′ ≡ β  > −2         
which implies 0 ) ( ) ( 2 < ′ ′ + ′ Q P Q Q P thereby ensuring that industry retail marginal 
revenue is downward sloping and that the second order conditions for the retail stage 
are satisfied for any market structure.
8   
If retailer i’s output is denoted xi and manufacturer i’s output is denoted yi then 
retailer pay-offs are given by 
( 2 )       Ri = (P(Q) − w)xi     i = 1,…,r 
whereas manufacturer pay-offs are given by 
(3)      M i = (w − c)yi     i = 1,…,m   
The m manufacturers and r retailers play a two-stage game that involves simultaneous 
choice in each stage.  In the first stage each manufacturer chooses their level of output 
xi taking into account the impact of their choice on the equilibrium level of the 
wholesale price. In stage 2 the retailers take the wholesale price as given and choose 
output yi in Cournot fashion. This game is solved using backward induction. 






 and then differentiate (2) with respect to xi to obtain 
(4)      0 ) ( ) ( = − ′ + w Q P x Q P i          i = 1,…,r  
which implies that the derived inverted industry demand by the retailers for the output 
produced by the manufacturer’s  (denoted w(Q, r)) is the horizontal sum of the retail 
marginal revenue curves. Substitute w = w(Q, r) and then apply symmetry by letting xi 
= Q/r to obtain that w(Q, r) is given by 
(5)      ) , ( ) ( ) ( r Q w Q P Q P r
Q = ′ +       
                                                           
8 In a symmetric model the condition which ensures that retail outputs are strategic substitutes is β(Q)  
≥ −r. If r > 2 then (1) implies, and is stronger than, the strategic substitutes condition.  In the merger 
literature the strategic substitutes assumption has been used by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Levin 
(1990) and Gaudet and Salant (1991), whereas the downward sloping industry marginal revenue 
assumption has been used by Kamien and Zang (1990), Cheung (1992) and Faulí-Oller (1997). 
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Differentiating (5) yields the following comparative statics  
(6a)     
r
Q r Q P
r Q wQ
) ) ( 1 ( ) (
) , (
β + + ′
= < 0      
(6b)      0
) (





r Q wr ,      
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. (6a) implies that the derived demand for 
manufacturer’s output is downward sloping (i.e. the wholesale price must fall in order 
for manufacturers to sell more output to profit maximizing retailers). (6b) implies that 
an increase in demand for manufacturer’s output brought about by an increase in the 
number of retailers will cause the wholesale price to rise.  
Let me now derive some of the higher order derivatives of w(Q,r) that will be 
required for subsequent analysis. Let
2 2 ) , ( ) , ( Q r Q w r Q wQQ ∂ ∂ ≡ and 
r Q r Q w r Q wQr ∂ ∂ ∂ ≡ ) , ( ) , (
2 and then differentiate (6a) with respect to Q and r to 
obtain (7a) and (7b) respectively 
(7a)    
r
Q Q P Q r Q P
r Q wQQ
) ( ) ( ) ) ( 1 ( ) (
) , (
β β ′ ′ + + + ′ ′
=  
(7b)      2






− =  
Let α(Q,r) denote the degree of concavity of wholesale demand and then assume that 
(7c)      ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( r Q w r Q w r Q Q QQ ≡ α  > −2    
which implies 0 ) , ( ) , ( 2 < + r Q Qw r Q w QQ Q thereby ensuring that industry wholesale 
marginal revenue is downward sloping and that the second order conditions for the 
wholesale stage are satisfied for any market structure. 
 
LEMMA 1: If the concavity of the retail demand is constant and equal to β then the 
concavity of the wholesale demand is also constant and equal to β.   7
 
PROOF: Multiply (7a) by Q, divide the ensuing expression by (6a) and then substitute 
) ( ) ( ) ( Q P Q Q P Q ′ ′ ′ ≡ β  to obtain that the concavity of wholesale demand equals  
(8)      ) ( 1
) ( ) ( ) , ( Q r
Q Q Q r Q β
β β α + +
′ + = , 
If β(Q) = β then β′ (Q) = 0 and thus (8) implies that α(Q,r) = β as required.  






 and then 
differentiate (3) with respect to yi to obtain 
(9)      0 ) , ( ) , ( = − + c r Q w y r Q w Q i     i = 1,…,m 
Denote the equilibrium solution for industry output as Q(r,m).
9 Now apply symmetry 
and substitute yi = Q(r,m)/m into (9) to obtain that Q(r,m) must satisfy 
(10)       0 ) ), , ( ( ) ), , ( (
) , ( = − + c r m r Q w r m r Q w Q m
m r Q  
Differentiate (10) and then use (6) and (7) to get that the proportional increase in 
industry output is given by 
(11a)     
)) ( 1 (
1 ) , ( ) , ( 1
) , ( ) (
Q r r Q












if there is an increase in the number of retailers and by  
(11b)     
)) , ( 1 (
1 ) , (




if there is an increase in the number of manufacturers.  
Now let  ) , ( ~ m r w denote the equilibrium solution for the wholesale price (the ~ 
is used to distinguish the solution for the wholesale price from the wholesale demand 
function faced by the manufacturers). Since  ) ), , ( ( ) , ( ~ r m r Q w m r w =  then 
(12a)     ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ~ r Q w m r Q r Q w m r w r r Q r + =  
                                                           
9 Industry output will also depend on c but I have chosen to hide this fact to avoid clutter.    8
(12b)      ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ~ m r Q r Q w m r w m Q m =  
Substituting (6a), (6b) and (11a) into (12a) yields 
(13a)     ( )
() ) , ( 1
) , ( ) ( ) (
) , ( ~
2 r Q m r
r Q Q Q Q P





Substituting (6a) and (11b) into (12b) yields 
(13b)    
)) , ( 1 (
)) ( 1 ( ) (
) , ( ~
r Q m rm
Q r Q Q P





The following Proposition now follows from the comparative static results given in 
(11) and (13), the concavity assumptions in (1) and (7c) and the relationship between 
the concavity of retail and wholesale demand given in (8). 
 
PROPOSITION 1: (i) An increase in the number of manufacturers causes industry 
output to rise and wholesale and retail prices to fall. (ii) An increase in the number of 
retailers causes industry output to rise and the retail price to fall.  (iii) An increase in 
the number of retailers causes the wholesale price to rise, remain constant or fall 
depending on whether the concavity of retail demand rises ( ) (Q β′ > 0), remains 
constant ( ) (Q β′  = 0) or falls ( ) (Q β′  < 0), respectively. 
 
  Part (i) of Proposition 1 extends the ‘entry increases industry output’ result 
derived by Seade (1980) for Cournot oligopoly to the case of successive Cournot 
oligopoly.  The only difference between the two results is that the former depends on 
the concavity of the retail demand whereas the latter depends on the concavity of the 
derived wholesale demand.  Part (ii) of Proposition 1 shows that the countervailing 
hypothesis does not hold for the case of successive oligopoly. In particular part (ii) 
implies that increases in retail concentration result in higher not lower retail prices.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
   9
Finally part (iii) of Proposition 2 generalises the result obtained by Greenhut and Ohta 
(1976) to consider general demand functions and upstream oligopoly.  In particular 
Greenhut and Ohta  consider upstream monopoly and a particular retail demand 
specification which features constant concavity to show that downstream market 
structure does not affect the wholesale price.  Part (iii) shows that this invariance 
result continues to hold even if the upstream market structure is oligopoly and the 
concavity of retail demand is constant but does not for either monopoly or oligopoly if 
the concavity of retail demand varies with output.  
 
3. The profitability of merger 
 
At both the retail and manufacturing stages, it has been assumed that marginal 
cost is constant and that firms sell undifferentiated output. A merger involving k + 1 
firms at either stage will thus result in the merged entity operating only one of the 
firms involved in the merger and shutting down the remaining k firms. Consequently 
if there are N  ≥ 2 firms in a particular stage prior to merger then a merger of k + 1 
firms in that stage will reduce the number of firms in that stage from N to N−k. At 
either stage, it is profitable for firms to merge provided the post-merger profit of the 
single merged entity exceeds the collective pre-merger pay-offs of the merging firms.  
The pre and post merger payoffs of the merging firms are given by  ) , ( ) 1 ( m N R k +  
and  ) , ( m k N R −  respectively for a retail merger and by  ) , ( ) 1 ( N r M k +  and 
) , ( k N r M −  respectively for a manufacturing merger.  Comparing the pre and post 
merger profits of the merging firms yields that a retail merger is profitable if 







m k N R
    10
whereas a manufacturing merger is profitable if 







k N r M
 
Retail mergers: An expression for the left-hand side of (14a) can be found by 
analysing the symmetric equilibrium retail profit given by 
(15)      ( ) ( ) r
m r Q m r w m r Q P m r R
) , ( ) , ( ~ ) , ( ) , ( − =  
Differentiating (15) with respect to r and then dividing the ensuing expression by 
(, ) ( )
Q
r R rm P w =−  yields that the proportional change in retailer profit resulting from 
an increase in the number of retailers is given by 












+ =  
Now substitute  r
P Q w P
′ − = − , which follows from (5), and then substitute (11a) and 
(13a) to obtain   
(16)’    
)) ( 1 (
)) ( 2 ( ) ( 2
) , (
) , ( ) , ( 1
















Integrate the LHS of (16)’ to obtain 






















Now take the exponential of both sides of (17) to get 
















From (16)’, (18) and (14a) it then follows that a retail merger is profitable if 
(19)  1
)) ( 1 (
)) ( 2 ( ) ( 2
exp
) , ( 1


















Manufacturing mergers: A solution to the left-hand side of (14b) is found by applying 
the above analysis to the symmetric equilibrium manufacturer profit given by    11
(20)     ( ) m
m r Q c r m r Q w m r M
) , ( ) ), , ( ( ) , ( − =  
Differentiating (20) with respect to m and then dividing the ensuing expression by 
m
Q c w B ) ( − =  yields that the proportional change in manufacturing profit resulting 
from an increase in the number of manufacturers is given by 











+ =  
Substitute  m
QwQ c w − = − , which follows from (10), and then substitute (11b) to obtain   
(21)’     
)) , ( 1 (
) , ( 2
) , (
) , (
r Q m m
r Q m
m r M





= −  
Now follow the procedure indicated in the text between (16)’ and (19) and then use 
(14b) to obtain that a merger among k + 1 manufacturers is profitable provided 
(22)      1
)) , ( 1 (












Mergers under vertical integration: For the sake of comparison with existing results 
in the literature let me now present the merger analysis for the case in which all n 
firms in an industry are vertically integrated. If the symmetric Cournot equilibrium 
level of industry output is denoted Q(n) then the symmetric equilibrium profit for 
each firm in a vertically integrated industry is given by 
(23)      ( ) n
n Q c n Q P n
) ( ) )) ( ( ) ( − = π  
If there are N vertically integrated firms prior to merger then a merger of k + l 
vertically integrated firm is profitable provided 











which becomes  
(24)’      1
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after the solution for  ) ( ) ( N k N π π − is substituted (see Faulí-Oller (1997) for details).  
 
PROPOSITION 2: If upstream marginal cost and the degree of concavity of retail 
demand are both constant then (a) the profitability of a horizontal merger involving k 
+ 1 firms is the same in both the upstream and downstream stages provided there are 
the same number of firms in the merging stage prior to merger. (b) Furthermore a 
merger of k + 1 firms at either stage (i) is the same as a merger involving k + 1 firms 
in an industry in which all firms are vertically integrated, (ii) does not depend on the 
number of firms in the other stage and (iii) does not depend on the level of 
manufacturing marginal cost.   
 
PROOF:  If the concavity of retail demand is constant and equal to β then from 
Lemma 1 it follows that the concavity of wholesale demand is also constant and equal 
to β. Substituting  β β α = = ) ( ) , ( Q r Q  into (19) and (22) yields that a merger of k + 1 
retailers is profitable if 














and that a merger of k + l manufacturers is profitable if 














Both (19)’ and (22)’ are equivalent to (24)’ if β(Q) = β, thereby implying part (i) of 
the result, and are independent of c, thereby implying part (iii) of the result. 
Furthermore (19)’ is independent of m and (22)’ is independent of r thereby implying 
part (ii) of the result.  
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A priori one would expect that the effect of vertical separation and double-
marginalization on the profitability of merger to be ambiguous for the following 
reason. On the one hand double-marginalization enhances the profitability of merger 
because part of lost profit from the output contraction are borne by firms at the other 
stage of production. On the other hand double-marginalization reduces the 
equilibrium level of output in the post-merger stage which then reduces the 
profitability of merger because the price increase brought about by merger applies 
over fewer units of output
10.  Proposition 2 points out that under fairly general 
conditions the two effects cancel each other out and leave the profitability of merger 
unaffected by the extent of double-marginalization.  Since the number of firms at the 
non-merging stage determines the extent of double-marginalization then it follows 
that the latter does not affect the profitability of merger. Furthermore since a regime 
in which all firms are vertically integrated is a special case in which double-
marginalization is zero then the profitability of merger under a vertically integrated 
regime is the same as a merger in a vertically separated regime.   
Finally the reason that upstream mergers and downstream mergers are equally 
profitable follows from Lemma 1, Proposition 1 and from a previous result in the 
literature. In particular Faulí-Oller (1997) has shown that in symmetric Cournot 
oligopoly the profitability of merger depends neither on the positioning of the demand 
curve nor on the unchanging level of constant marginal cost, but rather depends only 
on the concavity of the demand curve faced by the merging firms, the pre-merger 
market structure and the number of firms involved in the merger.  The implication of 
                                                           
10 Vertical separation can also affect the response of the non-merging firms to the merger which then 
affects the extent of the price increase that the merging firms can achieve for any given output 
contraction. This effect is ignored in the above discussion because there is no clear intuition as to how 
vertical separation will affect the response of the non-merging firms. For downstream mergers there is 
also the possibility that mergers will bring about a reduction in marginal cost by resulting in a lower 
wholesale price. Proposition 1 rules out this possibility if the concavity of retail demand is constant.    14
this result is that the profitability of upstream and downstream mergers of equal size 
and identical pre-merger market structure in the merging stage can only differ if the 
merging stage marginal cost curves were to shift as a result of merger, or if the 
concavity of the retail and wholesale demand differed from one another.  The 
assumptions of the model and previous results derived in this paper rule out both of 
these possibilities.  In particular a change in manufacturing marginal cost brought 
about by a manufacturing merger is ruled out by assumption whereas a change in 
retail marginal cost brought about by a retail merger is ruled out by Proposition 1 if 
the concavity of retail demand is constant.  Secondly Lemma 1 establishes that the 
concavity of retail and wholesale demand do not differ from one another if the former 
is constant. 
 
4. The effect of market structure on the welfare effects of mergers 
 
Proposition 1 establishes that a horizontal merger at either the upstream or 
downstream stage reduces output and therefore lowers the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus (hereafter referred to as surplus). The purpose of this section is to 
determine the effect of pre-merger market structure, in both the merging and non-
merging stages, on the negative surplus effects of mergers. The motivation behind this 
analysis is to determine the effect of market structure on the size of the fixed cost 
efficiency gain required for a surplus reducing merger to increase welfare (surplus net 
of fixed costs).  More specifically the issue of interest is whether or not mergers in 
concentrated setting require a greater fixed cost efficiency gain in order to raise 
welfare than mergers in less concentrated settings.   15
Let me begin by denoting the number of firms in the merging and non-
merging stage by n and ñ respectively. Now let S(n,ñ) and Q(n,ñ) denote the 
equilibrium level of surplus and industry output respectively.  If ΔS = S(N−k, ñ) – 
S(N,ñ) denotes the change in surplus resulting from a merger then from the First 
Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and the definition of surplus it follows that 











) ~ , (
 < 0 
(25b)      where ()
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The effect of an increase in the number of firms on the surplus effects of a merger is 
thus given by 















) ~ , (
 






























if the rise in the number of firms occurs in the merging stage (prior to merger) and by 
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if the increase in the number of firms occurs in the non-merging stage.
11  If we now 
assume that the concavity of retail demand is constant then from (11a,b) we obtain 
that the comparative statics related to the merging stage are given by 





 > 0 
                                                           
11 (26a) is obtained by using the second and then the first fundamental theorem of calculus whereas 
(27a) is obtained by simply differentiating the integrand.   16
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and those related to the non-merging stage are given by 





 > 0 


















 > 0 
From (26a,b) and (28a,b) we obtain that   





 > 0 
In order to sign  n S ~ ∂ Δ ∂  we substitute (28d) into (27b) and then factor to obtain 



























From (5), (6a) and (9) it follows that  











which then implies that (30) becomes 








S ~ 1 ~
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PROPOSITION 3: If the concavity of retail demand is constant then (i) an increase in 
the number of firms in the merging stage (prior to merger) unambiguously reduces the 
negative surplus effects of merger (ii) an increase in the number of firms in the non-
merging stage reduces the negative surplus effect of a merger if  











(iii) an increase in the number of firms in the non-merging stage increases the 
negative surplus effect of a merger if    17












PROOF: (i) Follows from (29). (ii) Let x = −(n  + ñ + 1 + β) + nñ. From (27a,b) and 
(28a,c) and (30)’ we obtain that  n S ~ ∂ Δ ∂  is positive if x > 0 for all values of n 
between N and N − k. Since x is increasing in n (i.e. ñ > 1) then the latter is true if x > 
0 at n = N − k which yields (32). (iii) Conversely it follows that  n W ~ ∂ Δ ∂  is negative 
if x < 0 for all values of n between N and N − k. Since x is increasing in n then the 
latter is true if x < 0 at n = N which yields (33).    
 
  The conventional wisdom is that mergers have more negative effects on 
consumer and producer surplus when markets are more concentrated.  Proposition 2 
points out that the conventional wisdom is true even if markets are characterized by 
double-marginalization (part i) but that this presumption does not carry over to 
increases in concentration in the non-merging stage (parts ii and iii). The intuition 
behind the differing impacts of merging and non-merging stage concentration on the 
surplus effects of merger is as follows. There are two factors which determine the 
surplus loss associated with an output-reducing merger: the size of the output 
contraction and the total mark-up (i.e. the sum of the retail and wholesale mark-up). 
An increase in concentration at the merging stage increases both the total mark-up and 
the size of the output contraction and thus unambiguously increases the magnitude of 
the surplus loss brought about by merger. On the other hand an increase in 
concentration in the non-merging stage increases the mark-up but reduces the output 
contraction and thus has an ambiguous effect on the surplus loss associated with 
merger.     18
The reason that increases in concentration at either stage increase the total 
mark-up is straightforward: less competition yields higher mark-ups. The reason that 
increases in concentration have qualitatively different effects on the size of the output 
contraction is as follows.  The size of the output contraction brought about by merger 
depends on two factors: the response of the non-merging firms in the merging stage 
and the size of the market (i.e. the gap between demand and marginal cost). An 
increase in concentration at the merging stage implies that there are fewer non-
merging firms which then implies that the latter are collectively less responsive to the 
output contraction of the merging firms.  As a result the contraction of industry output 
will be larger when the merging stage is more concentrated.  On the other hand an 
increase in concentration in the non-merging stage serves to reduce the size of the 
market in the merging stage by either increasing the marginal cost in the merging 
stage, or by resulting in an inward rotation of the derived market demand in the 
merging stage, depending on whether the increase in non-merging stage concentration 
occurs at the upstream or the downstream stage. Since the size of the market 
determines the responsiveness of industry output to changes in market structure then it 
follows that an increase in non-merging stage concentration will reduce the size of the 
output contraction brought about by merger. 
Part (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 resolve the indeterminate effect of 
concentration in the non-merging stage on the surplus effect of merger as follows.  
Increases in concentration in the non-merging stage will magnify the negative surplus 
effect of merger if the non-merging stage concentration is initially low (part ii).  On 
the other hand if the non-merging stage concentration is already high then a further 
increase in concentration may reduce rather than magnify the negative surplus effect 
of merger (part iii).  Moreover the point at which further increases in concentration   19
start to reduce rather than magnify the surplus effects of merger depend on the 
concavity of retail demand.  For example, if demand is linear (i.e. β = 0) then a 
merger from triopoly to duopoly (i.e. N = 3, k = 1) will have a more negative surplus 
effect if the number of firms in the non-merging stage falls from some ñ > 2 to ñ equal 
to 3 but will have a less negative surplus effect if ñ falls from 2 to 1. On the other 
hand if the concavity of demand is given by β = 10 then the same merger will have 
more negative surplus effect if the number of firms in the non-merging stage falls 
from ñ > 13 to ñ = 13 and will have a less negative surplus effect if ñ falls from 6 to 




This paper has explored the profit and welfare consequences of horizontal merger 
in markets which feature vertical separation.  My model differs from previous papers 
in that it employs an arms-length linear contracting approach as opposed to a 
bargaining or a two-part tariff approach. One of the merits of my approach is that that 
unlike the aforementioned alternative approaches it does not assume that downstream 
firms deal exclusively with an upstream firm.  A consequence of assuming non-
exclusive dealing is that I can allow for an arguably more realistic setting in which 
both upstream and downstream firms make strategic capacity choices whereas the 
other approaches assume that only the downstream firm makes the capacity choice.   
A comparison of my results to those in the literature indicates that the nature of 
the contracting relationship qualitatively affects the profitability of horizontal merger 
but does not qualitatively impact on the welfare effects of horizontal merger.  In 
particular my welfare results are qualitatively similar to the bargaining and two-part   20
tariff results in that they imply that horizontal mergers reduce welfare.  On the other 
hand I have shown that if the concavity of retail demand is constant then vertical 
separation does not affect the profitability of merger. This result contrasts both with 
the linear tariff bargaining results of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and von-Ungern 
Sternberg (1996) which suggest that vertical separation can either enhance or reduce 
the profitability of merger depending on whether or not products are differentiated
12, 
and with the two-part tariff results of Ziss (2001) and González-Maestre and López-
Cuñat (2001) who show that vertical separation unambiguously enhances the 
profitability of horizontal merger.   
A second contribution of this paper is to show that the reduction in wholesale 
demand brought about by retail merger does not induce manufacturers to alter 
wholesale prices in the absence of any change in retail bargaining power. As a result 
retail mergers raise retail prices and are anti-competitive. The implication of this 
result is that an increase in retail bargaining power is a necessary condition for retail 
mergers to lower retail prices and enhance welfare in the absence of cost efficiency 
gains.  This result is particular relevant given the relatively lax antitrust treatment that 
retail mergers appear to receive in both the UK (Dobson and Waterson 1997) and the 
vacillating degree of antitrust enforcement of retail mergers in the US (Wrigley 2001).  
A final contribution of this paper is to derive comparative static results regarding 
the impact of market structure on the welfare effects of mergers. A standard 
presumption in the literature is that increases in concentration serve to worsen the 
welfare effect of horizontal merger. My results confirm that the conventional wisdom 
                                                           
12 In particular Horn and Wolinsky (1988) show that if products are differentiated substitutes and the 
upstream stage is monopoly then downstream merger for monopoly is never profitable under vertical 
separation whereas such a merger is always profitable under vertical integration. On the other hand 
von-Ungern Sternberg (1996) show that if products are homogeneous and the upstream stage is 
monopoly then a reduction in the number of retailers lowers wholesale prices. Since Cournot profits 
rise with a uniform reduction in the marginal cost and since merger results in shutdown when products   21
is true even in the presence of double-marginalization but shows that this result only 
applies if the increase in concentration occurs in the merging stage.  If the increase in 
concentration occurs in the non-merging stage then the negative welfare effect of 
merger may rise or fall with increases in non-merging stage concentration depending 
on the initial level of concentration in the non-merging stage and on the concavity of 
retail demand.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
are homogeneous then these results imply that retail merger is always profitable.    22
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